Even though he was inadvertently added to a list of people who were authorized to receive privileged information, those individuals did not publish that information.
Jeffrey Goldberg’s potential legal liability for publishing details about the Trump administration’s war plans hinges on a complex interplay of U.S. law, journalistic privilege, and the specific circumstances of his inclusion in the Signal group chat. While he was inadvertently added to a discussion among officials presumably authorized to receive classified or sensitive information, the fact that he—a journalist—published aspects of it raises questions about whether he could face charges for leaking or mishandling sensitive information. Below, I’ll explore this issue in detail, drawing on applicable legal frameworks and precedents, without reproducing the full text of Goldberg’s article but referencing the situation as described.
The primary statute governing the disclosure of sensitive national security information in the U.S. is the Espionage Act of 1917 (18 U.S.C. § 793-798). Section 793, for instance, prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information related to national defense that could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation. Penalties can include fines or imprisonment for up to 10 years. Key to this law is the concept of intent and authorization:
Unauthorized Possession: If information is classified or deemed “national defense information” (NDI), anyone who willfully communicates it to an unauthorized person can be liable.
Publication: The law also applies to those who publish such information, though prosecuting journalists has historically been rare due to First Amendment protections.
In Goldberg’s case, the administration’s use of Signal—a commercial app—complicates the classification status of the chat. If the “TEAM UPDATE” from Pete Hegseth contained classified details (e.g., specific targets, weapons, or timing of the Yemen strikes), it could qualify as NDI. However, the fact that officials transmitted it via an unsecured platform might undermine claims of its formal classification, as classified information typically requires handling through secure government systems like SIPRNet or JWICS. Brian Hughes’ NSC statement, calling it an “authentic message chain” but not explicitly labeling it classified, leaves this ambiguous (The Atlantic, March 24, 2025).
Goldberg’s Unique Position
Goldberg’s inclusion in the chat was accidental, not a result of him seeking out or soliciting the information. Legally, this distinguishes him from a traditional leaker (e.g., Edward Snowden or Chelsea Manning), who actively removes classified material from secure channels. He was passively added to a group of authorized recipients—senior officials like Michael Waltz and Pete Hegseth—suggesting he received the information lawfully, at least initially. The Espionage Act typically targets those who obtain or disclose information they know they’re not entitled to, but Goldberg’s situation blurs this line: he was invited into the conversation by the very officials responsible for safeguarding it.
However, his decision to publish parts of the chat shifts the analysis. While he withheld the full text “to avoid putting American personnel at risk” (The Atlantic, March 24, 2025), he still disclosed operational details—like the predicted 1:45 p.m. ET detonation time—that could arguably aid adversaries if read before the strikes. This raises the question: does his status as a journalist shield him, or does his publication cross a legal threshold?
First Amendment Protections and Precedent
The U.S. Supreme Court has historically leaned heavily on First Amendment protections for the press, even in cases involving sensitive information. In New York Times Co. v. United States (1971)—the Pentagon Papers case—the Court ruled 6-3 that the government could not restrain publication unless it could prove a clear and present danger to national security. Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Papers, faced Espionage Act charges, but the Times itself did not, as it was not the source of the leak. Similarly, in Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001), the Court held that a radio host who aired an illegally intercepted conversation was protected under the First Amendment because he obtained it lawfully and it concerned public interest.
Goldberg’s case aligns with these precedents in key ways:
He did not illegally obtain the information; it was sent to him by authorized officials.
His article serves a public interest by exposing a security lapse, a matter of significant national debate.
He exercised restraint by not publishing the full message, suggesting an intent to balance disclosure with safety.
Prosecuting him under the Espionage Act would require proving he acted with willful intent to harm the U.S. or aid a foreign power—something the government would struggle to demonstrate, given his role as a journalist reporting a blunder rather than a spy disseminating secrets. The Justice Department has rarely targeted journalists directly; cases like Julian Assange’s (ongoing as of 2025) are outliers involving active solicitation of leaks, unlike Goldberg’s passive receipt.
Comparison to Authorized Recipients
The officials in the chat—Hegseth, Waltz, Vance, etc.—were presumably authorized to receive the information and did not publish it. Their liability, if any, would stem from the initial breach (e.g., using Signal improperly or adding Goldberg), not disclosure. Goldberg, by contrast, took the affirmative step of publishing, but his legal exposure differs because he wasn’t bound by their oaths or security clearances. The government might argue he had a duty to report the breach rather than publicize it, but no such legal obligation exists for private citizens or journalists absent a specific court order.
Other Potential Charges
Beyond the Espionage Act, lesser charges like mishandling government property (18 U.S.C. § 641) or conspiracy could be considered, but these are long shots. The former applies to tangible property, not digital messages, and the latter requires agreement with others to break the law—neither fits Goldberg’s solo publication. The Presidential Records Act might apply to the officials’ use of Signal, but it’s a civil statute irrelevant to Goldberg.
Practical and Political Considerations
Even if legally viable, charging Goldberg would be a political minefield. The Trump administration has criticized The Atlantic and Goldberg personally, notably over a 2020 article alleging Trump disparaged fallen soldiers (denied by Trump). Pursuing him could be seen as retaliation, galvanizing press freedom advocates and risking a high-profile loss in court. The Biden administration’s 2021 decision to drop efforts to extradite Assange for publishing leaks (though not hacking) set a precedent of restraint that might deter action here (The New York Times, June 2021). Moreover, the administration’s own negligence in adding Goldberg weakens its moral and legal standing.
Expert Opinions and Likely Outcome
Legal scholars weigh in variably. Mark Zaid, a national security attorney, told The Guardian on March 24, 2025, “A journalist in this position is highly unlikely to face charges unless they actively encouraged the leak or published during an ongoing operation with clear intent to disrupt it.” Conversely, former DOJ official Bradley Moss speculated on X that “if the info was formally classified, the government might test the waters with a case, but the optics would be disastrous” (X Post, March 24, 2025).
Given the accidental nature of Goldberg’s inclusion, his journalistic role, and the administration’s culpability, charges seem improbable. The government’s focus will likely shift to internal accountability—disciplining officials or tightening protocols—rather than targeting The Atlantic. As of March 24, 2025, no official moves against Goldberg have been reported, and his article stands as a testament to both a security failure and the press’s fraught but protected role in exposing it. 17GEN4.com
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